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When Uncertainty Brings Pleasure: The Role of
Prospect Imageability and Mental Imagery
YIH HWAI LEE
CHENG QIU*
Consumers generally prefer certainty to uncertainty, which leads them to shun
uncertain situations. This research demonstrates, however, that consumers facing
uncertainty (rather than certainty) associated with a positive event (e.g., winning
a lucky draw but not knowing the exact prize won) can experience greater, longer-
lasting positive feelings. The sustainability of this pleasurable uncertainty effect
hinges on the (right) level of imagery elaboration that consumers generate about
the various possible favorable prospects of the event (e.g., imagining the possible
prizes from winning a lucky draw). Findings from two experiments support the
proposed imageability-based framework.
As the proverb “curiosity killed the cat” suggests, find-ing out about and resolving an uncertain issue may
not always be in one’s best interest. In a similar spirit, this
research examines uncertainty from events with positive fu-
ture prospects (i.e., individuals know that the prospects of
the events are of a certain positive nature, yet they do not
know which particular prospect will come true) and suggests
that people may gain more pleasure from such uncertain
situations rather than certain ones.
Consider an example of a “sure-win” lucky draw, in which
the consumers are assured of winning a prize from a pool
of potential prizes that are equally attractive. Upon drawing
a prize, the marketer may immediately tell the consumers
what the prize is, or alternatively, reveal the exact prize at
a later time so that the consumers are uncertain about the
prize for some period of time. Comparing these two ap-
proaches, which would bring more pleasure to consumers?
Previous research in different areas seems to bear different
implications to this research question.
First, given the typical negative affective consequences
of uncertainty (e.g., Calvo and Castillo 2001; Loewenstein
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1994), would the state of being uncertain, regardless of
whether the prospects involve gain or loss, always evoke
negative feelings? Alternatively, from the perspective of ex-
pected utility framework, since the different prospects of
the events are equally favorable regardless of the degree of
uncertainty (i.e., equal expected utility), would we observe
little difference in consumer feelings between the uncertain
and certain situations? A third possibility is suggested by
recent research on events with positive uncertain prospects,
which demonstrates the positive affective consequence of
such uncertainty (Wilson et al. 2005). Our research is more
in line with this last perspective than with the previous two.
However, unlike Wilson and colleagues’ (2005) examination
of positive uncertainty where resolution is not expected (e.g.,
receiving a gift from an anonymous entity; in their study
1a), we focus on positive uncertainty with an anticipated
resolution in a relatively short time—a characteristic that is
highly applicable to the marketplace. In doing so, we un-
cover the process underlying the pleasurable uncertainty ef-
fect and specify the circumstances under which this effect
may emerge.
We compare uncertainty (e.g., winning a lucky draw with-
out knowing immediately what the exact prize is) and cer-
tainty (e.g., winning a lucky draw and knowing immediately
what the exact prize is) from positive marketing-related
events, and we suggest that, when their respective future
prospects are equally attractive, uncertainty would not only
elicit greater immediate positive feelings but also be more
likely to increase the duration of positive feelings beyond
a mere pleasant surprise. Moreover, the durability of positive
feelings hinges on the imageability of the uncertain pros-
pects. Specifically, the duration of positive feelings is likely
to increase as the level of imagery processing toward the
various possible prospects of the event (e.g., prize possi-
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bilities from a lucky draw) increases. Furthermore, such
imagery processing (e.g., visualizing the possible prizes and
the situations of using these prizes) would be favorably
enhanced when the uncertain prospects are high in image-
ability in terms of both amount and specificity of mental
imagery. When this happens, the imagery elaboration would
help sustain the positive feelings over time. In other words,
uncertainty prolongs pleasure via imagery elaboration of the
possible positive prospects. In contrast, consumers facing a
certain positive prospect (vs. uncertainty) are likely to imag-
ine less about the prospect and to experience more transient
positive feelings.
In the following sections, we first review relevant pre-
vious research to construct our theoretical framework. We
then report results from two experiments that lend support
to our hypotheses. Finally, we summarize the implications
of the present research, present a follow-up study exploring
consumer intuition about the pleasurable uncertainty effect,
and discuss potential avenues for future research.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The need to transform uncertainty into certainty and to
reduce the associated anxious feelings seems to be integral
in many aspects of human behavior (Calvo and Castillo
2001; Loewenstein 1994). Individuals may attempt to do
this by collecting information, making inferences, and gen-
erating theories (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Ofir
and Lynch 1984; Urbany, Dickson, and Wilkie 1989) to
resolve the uncertainty. However, not all forms of uncer-
tainty are necessarily aversive. In particular, uncertainty
from events with positive prospects can result in positive
feelings (Wilson et al. 2005). This form of uncertainty may
manifest in the consumer domain in a variety of ways, such
as the possible prizes from a lucky draw, the possible gifts
from a friend, or the possible annual rewards provided by
a brand club.
Research shows that emotion-eliciting events vary in the
degree of pleasure and activation that they produce (Russell
and Barrett 1999). In our context, when faced with an event
entailing positive prospects (e.g., winning a lucky draw), be
it certain (e.g., with a known prize) or uncertain (e.g., with
several potential prizes), people may experience positive
feelings due to the favorable nature of the impending pros-
pect. However, the activation level may differ because un-
certainty would evoke greater physiological arousal than
certainty would (Berns et al. 2001; Schultz, Dayan, and
Montague 1997), which then intensifies the emotional re-
actions toward the positive event. This link between arousal
and felt emotion has been suggested particularly in the the-
ory of transferred excitation (see Zillmann [1983] for a re-
view) and demonstrated under different domains. For in-
stance, Gorn, Pham, and Sin (2001) found that consumers
under higher arousal states would appraise an advertisement
more favorably if the tone of the ad was pleasant, and Dib-
ben (2004) showed that arousal increases the intensity level
of felt emotions from listening to music. Therefore, con-
sumers may experience greater, immediate positive feelings
when they encounter positive events with uncertain pros-
pects (e.g., not knowing the exact lucky draw prize for a
period of time) than with certain ones (e.g., knowing the
exact prize immediately). Note that, for this pleasurable un-
certainty effect to take place, the certain and uncertain pros-
pects (e.g., the prize possibilities) should be equally attrac-
tive. Otherwise, the difference in prospect attractiveness
may create extraneous feelings to entangle with those from
the uncertainty effect we examine. Therefore, we predict:
H1: Given equally attractive prospects (e.g., equally
attractive prize possibilities from a lucky draw),
uncertainty in positive events (e.g., winning a
lucky draw without knowing the exact prize im-
mediately) would elicit greater, immediate pos-
itive feelings than certainty in positive events
would (e.g., winning a lucky draw and knowing
the exact prize immediately).
Aside from examining the immediate effect of positive
uncertainty, we further investigate how such uncertainty af-
fects feelings over time. The prolonged effect of positive
uncertainty was demonstrated by Wilson and colleagues
(2005) in a movie plot context. Their participants were
shown a movie clip based on a real person’s life story.
Thereafter, participants assigned to the certain condition read
two paragraphs, each describing a possible happy ending of
the main character that was beyond the conclusion from the
movie clip, and they were then told which version was true.
Participants assigned to the uncertain condition read the
same two paragraphs without knowing which of the two
was true. Results showed that the latter group remained
happy for a longer period of time than the former group.
This finding can be explained by the emotion adaptation
model (Wilson, Gilbert, and Centerbar 2003), which sug-
gests that an uncertain, relevant event is likely to command
attention and elicit affective reactions until the uncertainty
is resolved via sense-making. The sense-making process in-
volves an attempt to arrive at a subjective resolution of the
uncertainty through, for instance, casual attribution, knowl-
edge assimilation, or knowledge accommodation. For the
movie plot example cited earlier, a sense-making process
may center on the participant rationalizing toward a specific
(or most likely) happy ending by piecing up the plot de-
velopment. Subsequently, participants experienced a reduc-
tion of uncertainty, got adapted to the event emotionally,
and switched their attention away from the event. Thus, the
further the sense-making process is delayed, the later emo-
tion adaptation would occur, and hence the longer the pos-
itive feelings triggered by uncertainty would last. While this
account helps explain when positive feelings would dissi-
pate, the precise mechanism as to why positive feelings may
be sustained before sense-making is not as well understood.
We propose that consumers experiencing uncertainty in a
positive event may mentally simulate their consumption of
the possible favorable prospects, a process which is akin to
prefactual thinking (Sanna 1996; Taylor and Schneider 1989).
The inducement of scenario constructions from impending
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future events is not new and has been proposed in research
domains such as decision making (Levi and Pryor 1987) and
emotions (Holmes and Mathews 2005). Furthermore, these
areas have commonly suggested that such hypothetical
thoughts may potentially generate mental imagery, that is, the
concrete sensory or perceptual representations of objects and
ideas in working memory (MacInnis and Price 1987). Such
mental imagery may take place even in the absence of the
real object that produces the genuine sensory or perceptual
experiences, and it is capable of eliciting affective reactions.
For example, mental imagery constructed during window
shopping (a vicarious consumption) has been shown to elicit
positive feelings among consumers (Holbrook and Hirsch-
man 1982; MacInnis and Price 1987). Along a similar line,
we propose that generating mental imagery about marketing
events with positive prospects (e.g., a lucky draw with var-
ious possible prizes) may bring about virtual consumption
experience that offers a sensory substitute to actual con-
sumption and in turn produces positive feelings. As such,
the uncertainty associated with the events should be able to
sustain the positive feelings elicited as long as it triggers
mental imagery sufficiently. By contrast, inadequate im-
agery elaboration can potentially impede the generation of
affective reactions. Along this vein, we propose that not all
events with positive uncertain prospects are able to sustain
the immediate positive affective responses they create. In
particular, the imageability of the possible prospects of the
event would affect the durability of the affective reactions.
Imageability refers to the ability of a stimulus to evoke
mental imagery, and a higher level of imageability tends to
generate more sensory images and greater imagery elabo-
ration (Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan 1968). Thus, to the ex-
tent that the sustained pleasurable uncertainty effect is due
to the generation of mental imagery, we posit as follows:
H2: Events with positive uncertain prospects (e.g.,
winning a lucky draw without knowing the exact
prize immediately) are more likely to sustain the
positive feelings individuals experience when
the prospects of the events (the prize possibili-
ties) are of higher imageability than when they
are of lower imageability.
As the prospect imageability of the events increases, it
should trigger a higher level of imagery elaboration, which
then contributes to sustaining the positive feelings experi-
enced during the events. This underlying mechanism would
therefore imply the following:
H3: The level of imagery elaboration mediates the
effect of positive uncertainty on the durability
of the experienced positive feelings.
In the following sections, we report how we tested our
framework across two experiments, each with a different
operationalization of prospect imageability. In experiment
1, we examined imageability based on the number of po-
tential positive prospects of an event (i.e., the prize possi-
bilities of a lucky draw). In experiment 2, we operationalized
imageability by manipulating the imagery-evoking nature
of the possible prospects and also collected process measures
to further validate our predictions.
EXPERIMENT 1
In experiment 1, we varied the number of possible pros-
pects of a positive event to manipulate prospect imageability.
This allows us not only to test hypotheses 1 and 2 but also
to examine a curiosity-based alternative explanation for hy-
pothesis 2. In particular, as the state of being curious is
closely associated with uncertainty (see Loewenstein [1994]
for a review), concerns may arise with regard to whether
curiosity, rather than imagery processing, contributes to sus-
taining positive feelings following uncertainty. We therefore
designed this experiment to test the alternative explanation
against our mental imagery framework.
The Number of Possible Prospects, Prospect
Imageability, and Curiosity
Prospect Imageability and the Number of Possible
Prospects. Bone and Ellen (1992) proposed that the extent
and the content of elaboration are two broad dimensions of
imagery elaboration. From this perspective, we suggest that
the extent and content of elaboration may be positively as-
sociated with the number of possible prospects in an event.
However, this association may be bounded because, when
it comes to future prospects, people tend to keep in mind
only a few possibilities due to the limit of working memory
(Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991). Hence, having a large
number of alternative prospects is unlikely to aid imagea-
bility because of the lack of a specified set of identifiable
alternatives from which mental imagery can be concretely
generated. This, in turn, compromises the potential affective
experience from imagery (Frijda 1988) and impedes the
virtual consumption process highlighted earlier. Thus, higher
prospect imageability of an event should not be simply
equated with a larger number of possible prospects. Instead,
imageability should be higher when the number of possible
prospects is moderate (a condition where positive feelings
are more likely to be sustained if our prediction based on
mental imagery holds) rather than small or large.
Curiosity and the Number of Possible Prospects. Loew-
enstein (1994) presented a comprehensive review of curiosity
research and essentially theorized curiosity as an undesirable
state of being “uncertain” that enhances the desire to know.
From this perspective, it is conceivable that curiosity level
may vary depending on the number of possible prospects
in an event, especially when uncertainty resolution is antic-
ipated (Loewenstein 1994). An ensuing question is whether
the curiosity effect can account for the sustainability of feel-
ings under positive uncertainty. If it does, we would expect
positive feelings to be better sustained when the event with
uncertain prospects triggers a higher rather than a lower
curiosity level.
Drive theory (e.g., Berlyne 1954) generally predicts that
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curiosity level is heightened when uncertainty level in-
creases. From this perspective, curiosity level would be pos-
itively related to the number of possible prospects, and hence
positive feelings would be more sustainable as the number
of possible prospects increases. However, Loewenstein
(1994) proposed the concept of the knowledge gap (i.e.,
discrepancy between what one knows and what one wants
to know) and argued that curiosity may increase as the
knowledge gap shrinks. This is based on the argument that
people are more motivated to close the knowledge gap as
they get closer to their goal of resolving uncertainty. From
this perspective, it seems conceivable that, when the number
of possible prospects is smaller, the perceived knowledge
gap to certainty is also smaller and hence curiosity level is
higher. However, implied in the knowledge gap theory is a
progressive process toward resolving uncertainty, where the
number of possible prospects is reduced until final resolution
(much like in a game of Cluedo). This iterative process
of elimination is not present in our research, and hence the
applicability of the knowledge gap theory for our predictions
is somewhat tentative. Nevertheless, the inverse relationship
between curiosity and the number of possible prospects as
suggested by the knowledge gap theory is different from
the relationship between imageability and the number of
possible prospects, which allows us to test a curiosity-based
explanation against an imageability-based one.
Method
This experiment had a 4 (number of possible prospects:
one certain prospect vs. limited possible prospects vs. mod-
erate possible prospects vs. infinite possible prospects) #
3 (feeling responses were collected three times across dif-
ferent stages of the experiment) mixed-factorial design. We
used winning a lucky draw game to represent an event with
positive prospects. Uncertainty and prospect imageability
were manipulated via the number of possible prospects of
the event, that is, the lucky draw prize possibilities. One
hundred and twenty-one undergraduate students at the Na-
tional University of Singapore participated in the experiment
in exchange for course credit and were randomly assigned
to one of the four prospect conditions.
In the certain prospect condition, participants saw the
description of the prize they would receive immediately after
winning the lucky draw game. In the limited possible pros-
pects condition, participants saw descriptions of two prize
options—a set of stereo speakers or a radio set (each worth
$30)—and were informed that they would receive one of
them. The two prizes were pretested with 40 participants
and found to be of similar perceived value on a 5-point scale
anchored from “not a good value” to “an extremely good
value” NS).(M p 3.6, M p 3.45;speakers radio
In the moderate possible prospects condition, participants
were informed that they would receive a consumer elec-
tronics product worth $30 as their prize. The categorical
phrase consumer electronics product was pretested to elicit
relatively high levels of imagery processing. As the number
of possible prospects increases (e.g., as the product category
becomes broader), there may be more room for consumers
to engage in imagery processing but up to a point where
the number of possible prospects exceeds the limit of work-
ing memory, which eventually impedes the generation of
concrete mental imagery. To calibrate an appropriately high
imageability level for prospects in the event, we asked 20
undergraduate students to write down the thoughts they can
infer from a relatively broad categorical phrase consumer
electronics product and another 20 students to pen down
their thoughts on a relatively narrow categorical phrase mu-
sic player. Our purpose was to choose the descriptor that can
elicit higher imagery processing. The results showed that con-
sumer electronics product evoked a greater number of im-
agery thoughts (which took participants about 5 minutes to
write down) than music player did (Mcep p 4.80 vs. Mmp p
2.35; Therefore, we adoptedF(1, 38)p 22.87, p ! .05).
consumer electronics product as a cue to the content of the
prize, which should stimulate relatively high levels of im-
agery elaboration about the various possibilities involved.
The fourth treatment was the infinite possible prospects
condition. Here participants were simply told that they
would receive a prize worth $30, and no further details
given.
Procedure
Participants were told that the aim of the experiment was
to understand consumer responses in lucky draws. They
played a computer-simulated lucky draw game called “spin
the wheel.” All participants were predetermined to win (but
they were not aware of this) so that they would experience
positive feelings. Participants then received relevant infor-
mation on the prize (certain condition) or the possible prizes
(uncertain conditions) and were requested to indicate their
feelings immediately thereafter (T1). The positive feeling
scales were adapted from Edell and Burke (1987) with five
items—cheerful, delighted, happy, interested, and good (1
p not at all to 5 p very much). We also checked for
negative feelings, in which participants further rated the
extent to which they felt anxious, nervous, restless, bored,
irritated, and sad (Edell and Burke 1987). Participants in the
three uncertain conditions also indicated how curious and
uncertain they were about the prizes (1p not at all to 5p
very much). Next, participants were told that they would
have a short break while waiting for the prizes to be brought
to the lab. After 10 minutes, participants rated their feelings
again (T2). Participants in the three uncertain conditions also
rated their curiosity and perceived uncertainty, and they were
then informed verbally what exact prize they would receive.
Thereafter, all participants’ feelings were measured for the
third time (T3). Finally, to check for the preference similarity
between the two possible prizes (speakers and radio set),
participants in the limited possible prospects condition were
asked additional questions concerning their evaluations of
the two prizes using three 5-point scales (1 p not at all
appealing/desirable/of good value to 5 p very appealing/
desirable/of good value). Thereafter, all participants were
debriefed and given $30 instead of the real prize.
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TABLE 1
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1
T1 T2 T3
Positive feelings:
Certain (one certain prospect) 3.17 3.03 2.63
Uncertain:
Limited possible prospects 3.51 3.15 2.57
Moderate possible prospects 3.55 3.57 2.69
Infinite possible prospects 3.59 3.20 2.70
Curiosity:
Uncertain:
Limited possible prospects 1.84 2.13
Moderate possible prospects 2.10 2.67
Infinite possible prospects 2.47 2.90
Results
Confound Checks. The three items measuring prize
evaluations in the limited possible prospects condition (the
only uncertain condition where participants were given in-
formation about the two prizes) were averaged to form eval-
uation indices (Cronbach’s and .92 for the speakersap .83
and the radio set, respectively). An ANOVA with the two
indices as repeated measures confirmed equal attractiveness
of the two possible prizes (M p 3.39 and M p 3.17; F !
1).
Feelings. Factor analysis of the feeling measures in-
dicated the five positive feelings items loaded on the same
factor (with 75%, 60%, and 60% average variance extracted
at T1, T2, and T3, respectively), and they were averaged to
form positive feelings indices (Cronbach’s a p .92, .81,
and .83 for T1, T2, and T3, respectively). An ANOVA
involving number of possible prospects as a between-sub-
jects factor and the three positive feeling indices as within-
subjects measures revealed a significant interaction effect
Table 1 presents the descriptive(F(6, 234)p 3.59, p ! .05).
statistics. A similar analysis conducted on negative feelings
reveals no significant effects and will not be discussed fur-
ther.
To test hypothesis 1, we focused on positive feelings at
T1 (i.e., immediately after participants won the lucky draw
and received information on the possible prize) and con-
ducted planned comparisons between the certain and the
uncertain conditions. As predicted, participants in the un-
certain conditions experienced greater positive feelings than
those in the certain condition vs. Mcertain p(M p 3.51limited
3.17; Mmoderate p 3.55 vs. McertainF(1, 117)p 5.77, p ! .05;
p 3.17; Minfinite p 3.59 vs.F(1, 117)p 7.24, p ! .05;
the three uncer-M p 3.17; F(1, 117)p 8.57, p ! .05;certain
tain conditions did not differ from one another, F ! 1).
Next, to test hypothesis 2, we compared the positive feel-
ings at T1 and T2. As predicted, participants in the moderate
possible prospects (i.e., high prospect imageability) condi-
tion experienced sustained positive feelings from T1 to T2
In contrast, when pros-(M p 3.55, M p 3.57; F ! 1).T1 T2
pect imageability was low, participants’ positive feelings
dissipated significantly from T1 to T2 (limited possible pros-
pects condition: F(1, 117) pM p 3.51, M p 3.15;T1 T2
10.45, infinite possible prospects condition: MT1pp ! .05;
3.59, For the cer-M p 3.20; F(1, 117)p 12.01, p ! .05).T2
tain condition, participants experienced similar, relatively
low levels of positive feelings at T1 and T2 (MT1 p 3.17,
NS). Moreover, comparingM p 3.03; F(1, 117)p 1.57,T2
positive feelings at T2 across the four prospect conditions,
we found participants in the moderate possible prospects
condition experienced greater positive feelings (Mmoderate p
3.57) than those in the certain (Mcertainp 3.03; F(1, 117)p
37.5, limited possible prospects (vs.p ! .05), M plimited
and infinite possible pros-3.15; F(1, 117)p 22.9, p ! .05),
pects conditions F(1, 117) p 17.93, p !(M p 3.20;infinite
.05). Finally, the levels of positive feelings at T3 were similar
across the four prospect conditions (Mcertainp 2.63, Mlimitedp
2.57, Mmoderate p 2.69, Minfinite p 2.70; F(3, 117) ! 1).
Curiosity and Perceived Uncertainty. As expected,
the impact of the number of possible prospects manipulation
on curiosity and perceived uncertainty (measured in the un-
certain conditions only) was different from those on the
feeling responses. An ANOVA involving number of pos-
sible prospects as a between-subjects factor and curiosity
responses at T1 and T2 as repeated measures yielded a main
effect of number of possible prospects (F(2, 88)p 15.16,
and a main effect of timep ! .05) (F(1, 88)p 31.43, p !
At T1, curiosity increased as the number of possible.05).
prospects increased vs. vs.(M p 1.84 M p 2.10limited moderate
A similar patternM p 2.47; F(2, 88)p 7.33, p ! .05).infinite
was found at T2 as well vs.(M p 2.13 M plimited moderate
vs. Com-2.67 M p 2.90; F(2, 88)p 13.65, p ! .05).infinite
paring T1 and T2 responses, curiosity increased over time
in all three uncertain conditions (limited possible prospects
condition: vs.M p 1.84 M p 2.13; F(1, 88)p 4.88,T1 T2
moderate possible prospects condition:p ! .05; M pT1
vs. infinite2.10 M p 2.67; F(1, 88)p 17.99, p ! .05;T2
possible prospects condition: vs.M p 2.47 M p 2.90;T1 T2
An ANOVA conducted on per-F(1, 88)p 10.52, p ! .05).
ceived uncertainty revealed a similar pattern.
Discussion
Consistent with hypothesis 1, participants experienced
greater immediate positive feelings if they were uncertain
about what exact prize they would receive. Consistent with
hypothesis 2, when our participants were presented with
only two possible prizes or no clue to the possible prizes
(i.e., low prospect imageability), they experienced more
fleeting positive feelings than those in the moderate possible
prospects condition (i.e., high prospect imageability). To-
gether, these results suggest that consumer pleasure derived
from positive uncertainty is better sustained when the pros-
pect imageability of the event is higher. Furthermore, the
similar levels of feelings reported at T3 across the number
of possible prospects conditions suggest that consumers
adapted emotionally after uncertainty resolution.
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Note that to examine the hypothesized pleasurable un-
certainly effect, equal prospect attractiveness between the
certain and uncertain conditions needed to be ensured. Thus,
we specified the price of the prizes to be the same across
all number of possible prospects conditions. Moreover, the
pretest and confound check for prize likeability confirmed
the equal attractiveness of the two prizes adopted in the
certain prospect and limited possible prospects conditions.
Findings on curiosity and perceived uncertainty suggest
that curiosity is unlikely to be the mechanism underlying
the pleasurable uncertainty effect. In line with the drive
theory, curiosity tends to increase with the level of uncer-
tainty (as represented by the number of possible prospects
and confirmed by the perceived uncertainty measure). If
curiosity is the critical mechanism underlying the pleasur-
able uncertainty effect, we would expect positive feelings
to be most well sustained when curiosity level is at its high-
est (i.e., in the infinite possible prospects condition). How-
ever, we found positive feelings to be best maintained when
curiosity level is only moderate but prospect imageability
is at its highest (i.e., in the moderate possible prospects
condition). These findings support our conceptualization of
the pleasurable uncertainty effect based on imageability and
mental imagery.
Another competing account may be suggested, in which
participants in the uncertain conditions (vs. certain condi-
tion) were happier (H1) and maintained the happiness longer
(H2) because they may have anticipated receiving a prize
they preferred. Such “optimistic” anticipatory effect may
then drive the differences observed between the uncertain
and certain conditions. From this perspective, the chance of
getting a preferred prize may be a positive function of the
number of possible prospects (or the level of uncertainty)
because a larger number of possible prospects would allow
more room for participants to imagine the most preferred
prize than would a smaller number of possible prospects. If
so, the intensity and durability of positive feelings generated
in the three uncertain conditions should follow a similar
upward pattern. However, our findings exhibit a different
pattern. We found no difference in immediate positive feel-
ings (at T1) among the three uncertain conditions, and pos-
itive feelings were best sustained (from T1 to T2) in the
moderate possible prospects condition.
Note that we could not confidently ascertain a priori
whether the category cue chosen for the moderate possible
prospects condition had sufficient imageability, and we are
basing the success of the calibration from the findings. Like-
wise, although the two possible electronics product prizes
in the limited possible prospects condition (stereo speakers
and radio set) were found to be low in imageability, this
does not imply that prospect imageability is low whenever
there are two possible prospects. In experiment 2, we kept
the number of possible prospects at two and manipulated
imageability via the imagery-evoking nature of the possible
prospects. This manipulation reduces the reliance on par-
ticipants’ product category knowledge for the generation of
mental imagery. It also allows us to disassociate prospect
imageability from the number of possible prospects, which
in turn helps to further reduce the likelihood of competing
accounts from curiosity as well as optimistic anticipation.
EXPERIMENT 2
In addition to adopting a different manipulation of pros-
pect imageability, experiment 2 included process baseline
conditions, where participants received instructions to imag-
ine the prizes. Comparing these process baseline conditions
with the no-instruction conditions would allow us to ascer-
tain whether participants may generate imagery about the
prizes spontaneously. Moreover, we collected thought pro-
tocols to test hypothesis 3 regarding the mediating role of
imagery elaboration in the pleasurable uncertainty effect.
We employed a 2 (uncertainty: present vs. absent) # 2
(prospect imageability: low-imagery product vs. high-im-
agery product) # 2 (instruction to imagine: present vs. ab-
sent) # 2 (feeling measurement: T1—immediately follow-
ing the event vs. T2—10 minutes after T1) mixed-factorial
design. Uncertainty, prospect imageability, and instruction
to imagine were manipulated between subjects, whereas the
two feeling measurements were within subjects. One hun-
dred and thirty-six undergraduate students at the National
University of Singapore participated in the experiment in
exchange for course credit and were randomly assigned to
one of the eight between-subjects conditions.
Method
Similar to experiment 1, the event with positive pros-
pects involved winning a computer-simulated lottery game.
Again, unbeknownst to the participants, all were prede-
termined to win.
Manipulation of Uncertainty. In the certain condition,
participants immediately received information on the spe-
cific prize they had won. In the uncertain condition, partic-
ipants were told that they would receive one of two possible
prizes, and they read the respective descriptions. The im-
agery-evoking nature of the prizes was varied to stimulate
different levels of imagery processing, as discussed in the
following section.
Manipulation of Prospect Imageability. Previous re-
search suggests that sensory-stimulating products would
elicit higher levels of imagery processing than products fea-
turing functional benefits (MacInnis and Price 1987; Unnava
and Burnkrant 1991). Based on a pretest, we selected a box
of chocolate including milk, white, and dark chocolate with
assorted flavors and fillings and a box of aromatherapy can-
dles coming with lavender, chamomile, and many other
scents as high-imagery products and a cutlery set and a
digital clock as low-imagery products. Eighty participants
in the pretest were asked to rate one of the four products,
each worth $10, regarding the level of imagery processing
elicited—“I imagined what it would be like to use the prod-
uct (1p strongly disagree to 7p strongly agree),” “While
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TABLE 2




Low-imagery product 2.66 2.21
High-imagery product 2.82 2.24
Uncertain:
Low-imagery product 3.02 2.34
High-imagery product 3.01 2.88
thinking about the product, to what extent did images come
to mind (1p to a very small extent to 7p to a very large
extent),” “While thinking about the product, I experienced
(1 p lots of images to 7 p few or no images),” as well as
how vivid, concrete, easy to imagine, easy to relate to, and
easy to picture the images were on 7-point semantic dif-
ferential scales (Bone and Ellen 1992; Keller and Block
1997). These items were then averaged to form an index of
imageability (Cronbach’s As expected, the choc-ap .83).
olate and the candles were rated significantly higher in im-
ageability than the digital clock and the cutlery set (Mchocolate
p 4.50, vs. Mclock p 3.81;M p 4.92 M p 3.94,candle cutlery
F(1, 76)’s 1 9.76, p-values ! .05). Moreover, another test
was conducted among 28 undergraduate students who pro-
vided their product preferences toward either the two low-
imagery products or the two high-imagery products. The
products were evaluated on four 5-point scales (1p not at
all like/appealing/desirable/of good value to 5 p like very
much/very appealing/desirable/of good value), which were
later averaged to form an evaluation index (Cronbach’s
An ANOVA with imageability as a between-a’s 1 .90).
subjects variable and the two possible prizes as a within-
subjects variable was conducted on the evaluation index.
None of the effects were significant, suggesting equal at-
tractiveness of the different prizes Mcandle(M p 3.11,chocolate
p 3.04, Mcutlery p 3.04, NS). Hence, partic-M p 3.13;clock
ipants’ feelings after winning the lottery game were unlikely
to be confounded by the likeability of the different prizes.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were told that the aim of the study was to
understand consumer attitudes toward a lottery. They then
played the lottery game and were notified that they had won
a prize worth $10. Participants assigned to the uncertain
condition were informed that they would receive one of two
possible prizes (chocolate or aromatherapy candles for the
high-imagery product condition; cutlery set or digital clock
for the low-imagery product condition). Participants as-
signed to the certain condition only knew the specific prize
they had won (either of the two prizes from the high-imagery
or the low-imagery product set; counterbalanced). After see-
ing the prize description, participants indicated their feelings
at that moment (T1) via the same set of scales that were
used in experiment 1. Next, participants in the instructed to
imagine condition were asked to imagine about the prizes
they may get and to write down the thoughts that came to
them. Upon completion, they performed a 5-minute filler
task relating to their attitudes toward the lottery. Participants
in the no-instruction condition did not receive the instruction
to imagine; they completed a 10-minute filler task relating
to their attitudes toward the lottery. After the filler task, all
participants’ feelings were measured again (T2). The par-
ticipants then provided their responses for the imageability
manipulation check. At the end of the experiment, each
participant received a prize from the lottery game and was
then debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Check. The manipulation check items
(7-point scales regarding how vivid, concrete, easy to imag-
ine, easy to relate to, and easy to picture the prize images
were) were averaged to form an index of the imagery-evok-
ing quality of the prizes (Cronbach’s As expected,ap .88).
the high-imagery prizes were rated higher in imageability
than the low-imagery prizes vs.(M p 5.08 M phigh low
This main effect was not4.56; F(1, 128)p 6.15, p ! .05).
qualified by interaction with other factors.
Feelings. The items measuring positive feelings were
averaged to form indices of positive feelings (Cronbach’s
and .90 for T1 and T2, respectively). Preliminaryap .82
analysis confirmed that the instruction to imagine factor did
not produce any significant effects NS).(F(1, 128)’s ! 2.03,
We therefore collapsed the instruction and no-instruction
conditions in subsequent analyses. An ANOVA (see de-
scriptive statistics in table 2) involving uncertainty and pros-
pect imageability as between-subjects factors and positive
feelings at two points of time as repeated measures revealed
a significant three-way interaction between uncertainty, pros-
pect imageability, and feeling measurement (F(1, 132) p
10.54, All effects for negative feelings were notp ! .05).
significant and will not be discussed further.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, after participants were no-
tified of the prize(s) at T1, those in the uncertain conditions
experienced greater positive feelings than those in the certain
conditions vs. F(1, 132)(M p 3.01 M p 2.74;uncertain certain
p 12.51, regardless of the imagery-evoking naturep ! .05),
of the prize Moreover, positive feelings declined(F ! 1).
significantly from T1 to T2 among participants in the certain
conditions (high-imagery product: vs.M p 2.82 M pT1 T2
; low-imagery product:2.24 F(1, 132)p 30.19; M pT1
vs. ; both p-values !2.66 M p 2.21 F(1, 132)p 19.27,T2
.05), as well as among participants in the uncertain, low-
imagery product condition vs.(M p 3.02 M p 2.34;T1 T2
In contrast, participants whoF(1, 132)p 42.04, p ! .05).
were uncertain about the two possible high-imagery prizes
remained as happy after 10 minutes and MT2(M p 3.01T1
p 2.88; NS), supporting hypothesis 2.F(1, 132)p 1.54,
Level of Imagery Elaboration as Mediator. The listed
thoughts were coded by two independent judges as either
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an imagery or nonimagery thought. We considered imagery
thoughts to be those that clearly relate to vicarious con-
sumption, such as about the sensory aspect of the prizes or
the situation for using the prizes (e.g., “I wonder how it
would feel like if I lit the candle during my study time”).
Thoughts that did not fit this criterion were classified as
nonimagery in nature (e.g., “I wonder how long the candle
will last”). Interrater reliability was .89, and the inconsis-
tencies were resolved after discussion. We then divided the
number of imagery thoughts by the total number of thoughts
to create an imagery elaboration index.
We predicted that the level of imagery elaboration would
mediate the effect of positive uncertainty on the durability
of positive feelings. To test this hypothesis, we created a
feeling durability variable by subtracting the level of positive
feelings at T2 from those at T1. A smaller value of this
variable represents higher feeling durability. When feeling
durability was regressed on uncertainty, prospect image-
ability, and uncertainty by prospect imageability, the un-
certainty by prospect imageability interaction was significant
When the mediator, im-(bp .49, tp 2.41, p ! .05).
agery elaboration index, was regressed on uncertainty, pros-
pect imageability, and uncertainty by prospect imageability,
there was also a significant uncertainty by prospect image-
ability interaction effect Fi-(bp .54, tp 2.65, p ! .05).
nally, when feeling durability was regressed on uncertainty,
prospect imageability, uncertainty by prospect imageability,
and the imagery elaboration index, the imagery elaboration
index remains a significant predictor (bp.62, tp6.09,
while the effects of the other independent variablesp ! .05)
became insignificant. The reduction in the significance level
of the uncertainty by prospect imageability interaction was
further confirmed by a Sobel (1982) test (z p 2.44, pp
.01). In support of hypothesis 3, the level of imagery elab-
oration fully mediated the effect of uncertainty and prospect
imageability on the durability of positive feelings. Two ad-
ditional analyses with the total number of thoughts and the
number of imagery thoughts separately regressed on un-
certainty, prospect imageability, and uncertainty by prospect
imageability showed insignificant interaction between un-
certainty and imageability.
Discussion
Consistent with hypotheses 1–3, our findings suggest that
events with positive uncertain prospects that are higher (vs.
lower) in imagery-evoking qualities elicit greater immediate
positive feelings that are also more sustainable. Furthermore,
the uncertainty effect on the sustainability of the elicited
positive feelings is mediated by the relative amount of im-
agery elaboration. In sum, this experiment offers further
proof that uncertainty from possible favorable prospects that
are high in imageability would enhance the durability of
positive feelings. Moreover, this experiment included pro-
cess baseline conditions where participants were prompted
to imagine about the possible prizes. The fact that this treat-
ment produced no differences in effects suggests that con-
sumers may spontaneously generate mental imagery that
helps sustain the pleasurable uncertainty effect.
The earlier highlighted competing explanation based on
optimistic anticipatory effect under uncertainty also has lim-
ited applicability to our findings here. The (four) prizes we
used were pretested to be equally attractive, and furthermore
the specific prize that was won had no bearing on the pattern
of findings (all effects involving the specific prize won as
an explanatory variable had a significance level greater than
.12). Moreover, while the possibility of anticipating a pre-
ferred prize was the same (i.e., one out of two possible
prizes) in the low-imageability and the high-imageability
conditions, positive feelings were more transient under the
low-imageability condition than under the high-imageability
condition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our research suggests that individuals can indeed experi-
ence greater pleasure from uncertainty than from certainty.
Uncertainty from events with positive prospects (e.g., winning
a lucky draw but not knowing the exact prize for a period of
time) would not only elicit greater immediate positive feelings
than certainty, but it would also increase the duration of the
positive feelings when the prospects are sufficiently high in
imageability. With two different manipulations of prospect
imageability across two experiments—one varying the num-
ber of possible prizes and the other varying the imagery evok-
ing nature of the possible prizes, we obtain converging evi-
dence that confirms our imageability-based framework.
In experiment 1, while imageability is presumably highest
with moderate possible prospects and curiosity is highest
with infinite possible prospects, we find positive feelings to
be better sustained in the high-imageability situation rather
than that of high curiosity. In experiment 2, with the number
of possible prospects held constant, we find positive feelings
to be better sustained when the prospects are more imagery
eliciting, again supporting our conceptualization. Moreover,
findings from the thought-listing protocol provide process
evidence that imagery elaboration is critical in sustaining
positive feelings.
Note that our findings on the immediate affective con-
sequence of uncertainty may appear inconsistent with those
from Wilson et al. (2005). Their participants in the certain
and uncertain conditions experienced a similar level of pos-
itive feelings immediately following the positive event,
whereas our participants experienced greater positive feel-
ings in the uncertain than in the certain condition. This may
be due to the way that certainty was differently operation-
alized. In Wilson and colleagues’ study, participants in the
certain condition learned about all possible prospects and
were then immediately told which specific prospect was
applicable. In our study, however, participants in the certain
condition only learned about the specific prospect applicable
to them. We deliberately employed this experimental pro-
cedure for two reasons. First, we aimed to follow market-
place situations in which consumers are typically informed
of a specific winning prize if the promotion event is designed
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without an uncertain prize structure. Second, we tried to
minimize a potential “psychological endowment effect” that
may be introduced if we were to show all possible prizes
in the certain condition. Although participants were then
notified of the specific prospect, they might have continued
to think about the other “forgone” possible prospects, mak-
ing it potentially difficult for us to clearly discern the effects
under the certain condition.
Aside from confirming the immediate pleasurable effect
of uncertainty, the temporal aspect of the effect arguably
bears richer theoretical implications. In this respect, our
main contribution lies in identifying the role of prospect
imageability and the ensuing imagery elaboration as the
mechanism responsible for the sustainability of the plea-
surable effect. In a related vein, we examined imageability
from the perspective of the number of possible prospects
(experiment 1) as well as the imagery-evoking nature of
each possible prospect (experiment 2). Apart from these
prospect-related characteristics, future research may con-
sider both situational (e.g., retail environment; MacInnis and
Price 1987) and individual influences (e.g., dispositional im-
agery vividness; Pham, Meyvis, and Zhou 2001) as addi-
tional determinants of imageability.
Future research may also consider the contextual effects
that pleasure under uncertainty brings. Consumers in a pos-
itive mood (vs. in a neutral or a negative mood) have been
documented to form more favorable product evaluations,
weigh positive product attributes more heavily, and judge
brand extensions more positively (Adaval 2001; Barone,
Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Pham 1998). As such, it is not
surprising that investigations into ways to enhance consum-
ers’ positive moods bear both theoretical interest and prac-
tical implications. Along this line, our research suggests that
promotions incorporating positive uncertainty may place
consumers in a positive mood. Furthermore, since this pos-
itive mood originates from prospect-specific imagery elab-
oration and the increased accessibility of consumption im-
agery has been shown to enhance product preference
(Petrova and Cialdini 2005), it is probable that the mood
effects may be more prominent when consumers subse-
quently evaluate products that relate closer to the possible
prospects (e.g., forming a judgment about an electronics
product after winning a prize in the same product category).
This issue may be of particular interest to practitioners who
are concerned with the creation of positive uncertainty not
only as an end (delighted consumers) but also as a means
to an end (favorable responses to subsequent marketing
stimuli).
On a separate issue, we suspect that consumers may not
be able to correctly forecast the pleasure they would derive
from events with positive uncertain prospects and that they
may have a hardwired inclination to reduce uncertainty
whenever they have a choice. Individuals’ failure to predict
the intensity and duration of their future feelings has been
documented in the literature (Hsee and Hastie 2006). As
consumers tend to reduce uncertainty during their purchase
process (Urbany et al. 1989; Weinberg 2001), they may
overgeneralize this tendency to positive events and hence
still prefer certainty to uncertainty. To provide a preliminary
test of the potential misalignment between intuition (or fore-
cast) and actual experiences, we conducted a follow-up
study with 90 undergraduate students to investigate con-
sumer intuition about the pleasurable uncertainty effect.
Three sets of scenarios (each set with a certain and an un-
certain prospect) were created by modeling after the stimulus
design in experiments 1 and 2. Each participant was shown
one of the three sets (making 30 participants per scenario
set) and was requested to choose between the certain and
uncertain situations.
The three choice sets from the scenarios were (1) be-
tween knowing they have won a digital clock or knowing
they have won a consumer electronics product, (2) be-
tween knowing they have won a box of chocolate or
knowing they have won either a box of chocolate or aro-
matherapy candles, and (3) between knowing they have
won a cutlery set or knowing they have won either a
cutlery set or a digital clock. Prizes in each choice set
were specified to be of the same price. All uncertain
scenarios had a cover story in which participants would
know of the exact prize won after 10 minutes because
the staff needed to check “stock availability.”
Chi-square tests revealed that the choice share of the cer-
tain situation was significantly higher than that of the un-
certain situation in all three scenario sets (all p-values !
.05). Given that the eventual prospect is positive in nature,
83.3%/90%/80% of the participants chose to be certain of
the exact lucky draw prize in the digital clock/chocolate/
cutlery scenarios rather than being uncertain about the prize
for some period of time.
Uncertainty, whether involving positive or negative pros-
pects, is a common occurrence in the marketplace. An
equally common tendency seems to be for consumers to
avoid uncertainty even if it entails positive prospects. Ex-
tending research on uncertainty yet contrasting past em-
phasis on its negative implications (e.g., Chandrashekaran
et al. 2007; Urbany et al. 1989; Weinberg 2001), our research
shows that there is a pleasurable side to positive uncertainty
and further uncovers the underpinning imagery elaboration
process. Why then are consumers such poor predictors in
this regard? It seems probable that the requisite mental elab-
oration process is ill forecasted and underestimated with
regard to its pleasurable effects and as such not salient
enough in compensating for general uncertainty-reduction
behavior. The plausibility of this account and its underlying
reasons await further research.
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